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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

HENRY EARLEY,

)

Responden'•

vs.

)
)

KARL L. JACKSON•

Case No. 7725

)

AppeUant.

)

RESPONDENT'S PETI~ION FOR
REHEARING AND SUPPORTING BRI:IsF

The plaintiff and respondent in the
above captione-d case, on the grounds and

for the reasons hereinafter stated, raapectfully petitions the above court for
a rehearing in this case and recaueata that

the court vacate and set aside the order and
judgment of

tr-~is

court reversing the judgment

ot the lower court.
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POINT 1.

The court has erroneoual7

based its decision on the ground that the
driver of the appellant's ear was con•
fronted w1 th an emergency of the respondent's
making.

In so doing 1 t has oompletel7

oYerlooked

m~terial

eY1dence in the case

trom which the jury could have found that

the driver ot the

appellant~s

car never

saw the respondent's parked.vehicle an4
accordingly could net be confronted with

any emergency in attempting to avoid a

collision with it.
POINT 2.

The court in holding that

the driver of the appe1lant•s car was not
able to determine the presence of the park eel
truck until he was within 250•'300 feet

ot

it has completely overlooked the provisions
I

ot Section 5?·7-196 (a), Utah Code Annotated,
and eases ot this court decided thereunder.
POINT 3.

The court has misconstrued

the facts and the law in holding that the
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respondent d8liberately ran into the eourae
of the appellant's vehicle and placed him•

selt in the path which that vehicle would
have to take in avoiding a collision with

the respondent's truck.
\VHEREFORE. pet! t1oner prays

that he

be granted a rehearing in this oause and

that the matter be set down for further
argument and that on such hearing the court

set aside and vacate its £ormer judgment

and decision tiled herein and enter herein
a decision affirming the deeision of the

lower court.

RICH & STRONG

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PBTITION
FOR REliEARING

It clearlJ. appears from the opinion that

this court did not have in mind all of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

material tacts and evidence at the time ot
making its decision.

Important evidenoe

has been completely and w'h.olly overlooked.
Such e'rldence, which the ju!7' oould have
bel18Yed,. supports the judgment

lower court.

o~

the

The interests of our client

and the ends of justice require that the

record in this case 1 and particularly the
portions herein mentioned, be reexamined and

the case reheard.
POIN'l' 1.

I'TS ·
DECISION ON THE FACT THAT THE DRIVER OF
THE APPELLANT'S CAR WAS OONFROlrrED Vi!TH AW
THE COURT HAS ERRONEOUSLY BASED

EMEal.GENCY OF THE RESPONDE!TT'S MAKING. IN SO
DOING IT HAS COMPLETELY OVERLOOKED li1AfERIJ\L
EVIDENCE IN THE CASE FROM \VtiiCH Tit.~ JURY
COULD HAVE FOUND THAT THE DRIVER OF THE
APPELLANT'S CAR lt:EVER SAW THE P...ESPOI\fT.JENT'S
PARKED VEHICLE AND ACCORDINGLY COULD NOT BE
CONFRONTED ~i~"IT'H ANY lJIIERGENCY IN ATr.r:EM:PT!lfG
TO AVOID A COLLISION WITH IT.

This court by its opinion has held that

the driver

or

the appellant's oar was con•

fl'onted with an emergency of the respondent's
own makingJ that by reason thereof his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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attention was directed on the respondent's

stalled truck and 1n getting eately around itJ
that the driver had to swerve to the north
and was excused trom earlier ascertaining
the respondent t s presence on the north edge
of the h1ghwq.

All of this assumes that

the driver of the appellant's truck aaw the

respondent's sta1led vehicle blocking the
south side ot the z-oad.

True, the d:Piver

of the appellant's truck did testify that
he saw the vehicle when he was within 000

or

300

teet of it and turned to the left

to avoid it.

However, there was other

material evidence in the case on this uoint
.,_
Whieh has been completely

this court.

ove~loolted

'b7

Harold Johnson. one of the

persons who arrived on the scene shortly
following the accident. testified that
tollow·ing the acoident the driver of the

appellant's truck in his presence stated
that he had not seen the
~t

r~sRondent's

trucfi

all, but had just seen the respondent out
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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waving his bands, (R. 184, 186).

!here was,

accordingly, a eon.fllot in the evidenoo on

this potnt.

It was for the jury to determine

whether the facts wore as testified to by
the driver at the trial or whether Johrls011 7 S

testimony abon-fj the driver's staternent made
in Jorlllson's presence after ·the accident

occurred

wa~

true.

For the purpose

or

this

appeal the cotll"t must bear in mind that the
jU%7 under the -evide·nee could well have

found that the driver of the appellant's
•
truck never saw the respondent's truck at

all• but merel7 saw the r«spondent on the
highws.y waving_ his arm•.

SUeh being the

case, the driver c-ould not r)ossibly b.a,,e

been

con~~nted

with an emergency.

The

emergency, it any, could only be based on
knowledge that the s.ou.th half of the highway

was blocked by the respondent's truck.
out such knowledge, the presence

or

With•

the

truck was wholl7 immaterial and could not
be used as an excuse for the appellant's
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car awel'ving to the left into the respondent

or tor the failing of the drivor to ascertain
the respondent's presence upon the higtrrray.
Under this theory- of the case we simply l1ave

the respondent running in a

\vest~8l11 l~r

direction

down the north edge of the highway, ti-!e

appellant's truck being operated in an
aastarly direction on the noutl1 ,side of
the '}l.i.ghway, and the appellant's d.ri ver

failing to see the respondent unt:tl he was

too close.

The~,

in his cxcitementt he

suddenly applied the brakes, causing the
tru~k

to skid out of control, swe1-.,re to

the north and strike \the respondent on the
nortb edge of the paved road.

If the

driver of the appallant's truck did not
see the respondent's vehicle, but merely

saw the

~espondent

on the north edga or the

road, we submit tb.at there 13 no justtficat1on
whatsoever for the appellant' a truelt

sw~T,ing

to the north and striking the respondent.
The negligence of tb.e truck dl?iver :tr1 tailing
• f"
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to have his vohicle under

cont~ol,

under suoh

circumstances, would be the sole proximate
cause

or

the acciden'•
POINT 2.

THE COUR'!' IN HOLDING THAT Tlf}i; DRIVER OF
'l.HE APPkl:.LA-lfT'S CAR WAS NOT ABLE TO DJ~TlmMI}TE
THE PRESI~TCE OF THE HlRKB'D TRUCK UNTIL !IE
1:JAS ~1ITHIN 250•300 F3ET OF IT 1-IAS COMPL1~TEr..Y~
OVT!RLOOKED THE PROVISIOl{S OF SECTION 57•7•198
(a), UTAH CODE ANNOT~\'l'ED• AND CASES OF THIS

COURT DECIDED THER&\JNDER.

This court in the opinion sets torth

"that the driver (of appellant'·s truck) was
not able to determine until he was within
250--300 teet of the parked tr·uck that

it was obstructing the entire lane ot his
side of tratric."

This again is the testimony

given b7 the driver of the appellant's truck.
but the distance at which he actually saw the
truck is not the same as the distance at which
he should haTe observed 1 ts presence upon
the highway.

Section 5?·7-198 (a), Utah

Code Annotated, requires that every vehicle
shall be equipped with

·head~ights

ot such

intensity on high beam "gs to reveal

p•rson~

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

and vehicles at a distance o£ at least 350

·~

feet ahead tor sll

.

co~ditions

of

~oadi~·"

The driver of the appellant's truok testitied
that his headlights were burning on high
beam. (R. 253.) • . There was no oneoming
traffic or obstructions to vis-ion, (R. 265,
268, 282).

Accordingly, by statute, he

should have been able to detect the presence
of the truck and

a

so the respondent's pytasenee

on the highway nt a distance of at least 350
feet from each.

In connection with an. earlier

version of tnia statute this court has held

or

that it is the duty

an operator to have

a vehicle equipped with headlights ae

required b:r statute ant!. to keep such eol'ltrol

ot his car as w111 enable him to stop and
avoid obstl'tlctions that :f'a.ll within the
range of his vision.

See D,al.,lez ys,.. !A:id..

~estern D~irz

Products Co!!JPanz, ,e.t al, 80

Utah 331, ar:d

11i~oleropoulos

.vs.

Rams"ez~

61 Utah 4G5.
Th.e driver

or

the appellant's truck
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should, ther·et'ora, have detected the presence

ot the parked tlt'ltok on 1he highway at a
distance of at least 350 feet and should
have been able to stop

the

pa~ked

truok.

prio~

to re.a·ebing

If, as we have seen

in our disou.ssion under Point l, the clr:tver

of ep pellant 's truck did not see the

presence of the respondent's tl'.uek, then

.

there was nothing to

d!st~aot

even under the reasoning

he most

or

his attention,

this coll!'t, and

should have seen respondent's

ee~tainly

pi-esence on the highway at a distance of
at least 350 feet.

Under. eithe:r theory the

driver of appellant's trt1ck should have been
able to atop be.fore reaching the pal'ked tl'uek

or before striking respondent, and tl1era

was no reason tor the sudden

sw~rving

or

the appellant's truek so as to strike the
respondent on the no1.,th edge of the

~oad.

POINT 3.
THE COUR'!' !!AS MISC01'TSTRUED THE FACTS
A!~ID

THE LllW IN HOLDI1TG THAT Tlfri! RESPOND~JT
DELIBERAT~T_.Y R.A~N INTO THE COURSB OF THE
APPELLANT'S VEHICLE A1\TD PLACED lii~.ISEL.B, Il~
T1r~ P.~TH WHICH THAT VEHICLE ~~tOUl,D 1IAVE TO
TAKE Ill AVOIDilTG il OOLLISIOrT \7I:fH THE;
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'!'his court in 1 ts opinion has held that

the respondent deliberately ran into the
course

or

a correct
ease.

the oncoming vehicle.
app~ication

of' the

This is not

av~_dence

in the

As indicated by the cou.rt in its

opinion, the evidence most favorable to the·
respondent would

edge

or

pla~e

him on the north

the paved portion of the rdghway.

There was also evidence f?om which the jury
could determine that the appell$nt t s trttck
was on the. south side ot the highway

?!l~1.en

the brakes were first applied, (R. 219).
Had the appellant's truck continued on its
course, there would have been no impact
as there would be at least 10 teet between

the respondent and the

le~t

side of the

appellant's truck as they pe.seed.

Certn 1n.ly,

in this sense it cannot be said that the
respondent was running directly into the
path of the .ahicle.
This court in its opinion has further
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contondod that the respondent placed himself

in tl1e course he knew the appellant's tr\)Ck

would have to take to avoid a collision.
This assumes that in orcter to
collision there \-:as no other

avoi~~

a

l'Ol~so~1uble

course open to t11e driver of tbo appo1la:nt 's
truck than to suddenly swerve

r:..~o1J ~i~he

south side of the highw&J. clear ovor to
I

the north edge of the paved road-

~t

140 feet west of .!t.ille pal"kad truck.

a polrrt

rve

subt1it that this is not a reasonable
in·cerpretation of either the facts or tr1e

law.,

As we have

3ean

in o1.1.r disoa.ss ion

under Point 2., ·tlle d.ri ver of tl1e appellant t s

truck should have seen the parlred tr11cl!
at a distance

o:r at loas.t 350 feet and

should have been able to stop witb.:Ln that
distance.

The

~esp')ndent

·sest:tfj.ed tbat.

would ha.'1e to turn to the left, but
expeeted

th~t

it would stop as it co·uld

have do r:e, (R. 146).

T't.cro r!ns ample
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round that the respondent acted as a reasonable man in assuming that the appellant'•
truck would not have to turn to the left

but would stop berore reaching the parked
truck as it was required
such action was

b~

law to do, if

necessaFY~

Assuming for the purpose

or

a.~gument

that the appellant's truck would have to

turn to the left to avoid a collision,
nonetheless, there was eertainly no reason
to expect that it would suddenly swer-ve

from the south side of tr1e highway clear·

over to the north edge

or

the paved. road

to avoid a vehicle Which was 140 feet distan-t,
140 feet is almost one quarter of a Salt Lake

City block,. and certainly the jury could
have found that the respondent acted as .a

reasonable individual in assuming that the

oncoming vehicle would not suddenly swerve
from its course elear over to the north

side

or

the road to avoid an object a quarter
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ot a block away.

There is, of course, ample

evidence to sustain a sudden swerving
because ot the testimor17 that the

appe~lant

truck was on tho south side of' the road

when the brakes were applied, (R.

219)~

and the additional testimour that the
~espondent

was ori

~he

extl:'erJe north edge

the paved road, (R. lll,

153~54),

ot

and tha

testimony from another witness as to the
brake marks that they zig•·sagged back and

forth across the highway, (R. lSS).

Under

the evidence in this case there was no

The truek

reason for a sudden swerve.

could have stonned
. . on the aoutl1 side before
.

reaching the stalled vehicle or it could
have proceeded either on the south half
or even in the middle of the road until

it safely passed the respondent and still
had 140 .feet within which to move over

entirely on the nol"'th halt of the road to
pass the parked vehicle.
CO!rCLTTSION
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It is undiaputed that the responctant

's

.1 ,1
,i ,.i

I, I 1,1 ~

~ ~\

in this case was seriouslJ and permanently
injttred.

Bet'ore depriving him of the

,: '·.

jury's award, we feel that this court should
reexand!16 its decision.

If ·!;he preser1t

decision is allowed to stand, in our opinion,

a gross miscarriage of justice will result
and the respondent .will have 11otl1ing for
his pain, s:lffsring and injuries.

It is,

therefore, respectfully Sllbmitt.ed that the

petition for rehearing should be eranted.
Respect~ul17 subMitted~

RICf: D:

STROl~G,

Attorno;ts :ror Plnin.tiff
and Respondent
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